INTRODUCTION
ket structure can be maintained concurrent with a patent system. The first is public perception. This paper examines the issues surrounding
The patent is not viewed as government regulathe patenting of life forms, specifically the social tion with a purpose, but as a fundamental part of and private costs and benefits of the Plant Varithe institution of private property; not as the creety Protection Act (PVPA) (Plant Variety Protecation of a statutory monopoly, but as protection tion Act, 1970) . The PVPA is a current issue, against theft. The second reason lies in the ecoencompassing all the elements of the economic, nomic justification for government intervention: social, and moral controversy aroused by the whenever the private marginal value product is broader issue of patenting life forms generally.
less than the social marginal value product of an The subsequent sections of the paper outline activity, and the private marginal cost exceeds the specific issues surrounding the PVPA, disthe social marginal cost, it behooves the governcuss the issue of plant patenting, present the arment to direct resources toward that activity, guments favoring and opposing plant patenting, since societal welfare can be improved. and, finally, present an analysis of the major is-
The competitive market thus tolerates govsues of the PVPA. ernment intervention when an activity is charac-A patent, simply stated, is the awarding of exterized by the described marginal benefit-cost reclusive ownership of a new invention, enabling lationship. More to the point, the government the developer to obtain whatever rewards that intervention encourages such activities. Patent might accrue from the invention. A governprotection, then, is a means to achieve this ment-granted patent confers certain rights and end-by temporarily raising the private marginal privileges on its owner and is considered private value product to induce the private sector to unproperty. Patents are thus a means of providing dertake the desired activity. The PVPA serves to incentive to engage in creative activity, illustrate the costs and benefits of government Patent protection and a competitive market intervention in the form of patent protection. structure have coexisted as basic tenets of soci-
The PVPA (P.L. 91-577) was enacted into law ety in the United States for nearly 200 years. Yet, on December 24, 1970. Its enactment was motithe inherent characteristics of patent protection vated by a desire to increase the return on private seem in conflict with conditions necessary for the research investment through enabling patents to efficient functioning of a competitive market be obtained for sexually reproduced plant varistructure. Patents may be barriers to market eneties.I Amendments to the original act were protry. The number of buyers and sellers may be posed in 1979 to extend the life of the patents and determined by the patent holder through licensto broaden the list of plants eligible for patenting. ing or contractual arrangements. Patents may When the amendments, bills H.R. 999 and S. 23, impede the flow of information and the mobility were first considered by the House and Senate of factors of production. By definition, the invenAgriculture Committees, the opposition became tion is distinct and unique; this implies the abso intense that the hearings were postponed sence of existing comparable products, eroding ("Opposition to Seed Law Mounts," 1979) . It the assumption of homogenous goods. Further, was nearly one year later, June 4, 1980, before the patent holder has been granted exclusive the House Agriculture Committee passed the power to negotiate contractual arrangements reamendments in a roll call vote of 35 to 2. The garding the use of the product, thus enabling an amendments were passed by the Congress in Deinfluence over price.
cember, 1980, before the 96th Congress adThere are two reasons why a competitive marjourned. 1979, 1980) . Briefly, genetic diversity is deterConsidered a key case in the Court's Spring decimined by the extent to which production of a sions, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that, specific crop is dependent upon one of a very few "it was not the Court's business to thrash out the varieties of seeds. The economic concentration broader questions raised by critics of genetic enissue arises from concerns that patents impeded gineering ... the opponents present a gruesome the information flow in the marketplace, create parade of horribles. .... We are without compebarriers to entry, and enable undue price entence to entertain these arguments-either to hancement. Patents are a recognized statutory brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear monopoly, and although it does not necessarily of the unknown or to act on them. The choice follow that statutory monopolies must also be . . . is a matter of high policy for resolution market monopolies, it is nevertheless a continuwithin the legislative process after the kind of ing concern. The issue also assumes an even investigation, examination, and study that legisbroader context: the desirability of granting patlative bodies can provide and courts cannot" ents on life forms of any kind. (Burger, 1980, p. 158) . Three recent events have converged to make
The third event relates to the current examinathis a topical social issue. The first is the protion of the structure of agriculture and the possiposed amendments to the 1970 PVPA (Plant Vable ramifications of the PVPA. The concern for riety Protection Act, 1980 2 UPOV, the International Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties, is an intergovernmental organization whose headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland. It is affiliated by an agreement of cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations system concerned with protecting patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other kinds of intellectual property. UPOV provides protection of new varieties of plants by granting plant breeders' rights, either in the form of a patent or a special title of protection, or by both. It began in 1961, and now has 12 member nations. Considerable concern has arisen that membersip in UPOV will make patent enforcement a serious issue. This concern emerges from the European Economic Community (EEC) Common Catalogue, a legislative attempt to standardize vegetable products marketed in the EEC. It is termed a preventive measure, to help keep patent infringement to a minimum, since cultivation of excluded varieties is punishable by fines. While the Common Catalogue is not sanctioned by UPOV, there is still some question whether membership in UPOV will lead to a catalogue in the United States. Furthermore, since the EEC adopted the Common Catalogue, hundreds of seed varieties have been declared illegal; this, they are no longer offered for sale and are disappearing. Several studies by genetic research centers speculate that by 1991, nearly three-quarters of all European vegetable varieties will be extinct. mittee on Agriculture, 1970) . Subsequently, think it should be strengthened via amendments, legislation to amend the 1930 Act was prowhile opponents question even whether it is deposed-to insert the words "or sexually" in secsirable to grant patents in this area, and, as such, tions 161 and 163 after the words their position contains the broad spectrum of ar-"asexually"-with the effect of enlarging the guments. class of patentable plants (U.S. Congress, House
The concept of patenting a variety of a good Committee on Agriculture, 1970) . The Departthat is implicitly considered to be publicly owned ment of Agriculture under Secretary Orville touches a "raw nerve" in many people; it evokes Freeman opposed the amendment on the grounds an emotion that transcends social and profesthat "it would threaten the continued existence sional strata. In particular, the fear is that patentof its long standing programs for developing and ing plants is a dangerous precedent to patenting introducing new varieties of seeds and it is scienmore sophisticated life forms, as in the case of tifically and legally unsound." (U.S. Senate, General Electric's microorganism. As a corolSenate Committee on the Judiciary, 1968, p. lary, the argument is often extended to any type 715). After consideration, the Senate Judiciary of patenting since (except for literary contribuSubcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and tions) all inventions are, at the extreme, merely Copyrights voted not to report the bill.
improvements on existing natural materials. In A major reason for failure of the amendment fact, this was the basis for Chief Justice Burger's appears to have been disagreement over the position in favor of General Electric (Burger, feasibility of achieving plant protection for sexu-1980). ally reproduced plants through the 1930 plant Proponents of the PVPA and the proposed patent statute. In fact, patenting for sexually reamendments include government and industry, produced plants was viewed by many to be sepawith arguments based largely on the need for rate from other patents because it involved a life economic incentives to induce private research form, and that such unusual inventions should and development. 3 They contend that plant prothus be treated by new laws (U.S. Congress, tection will: (1) greatly stimulate private plant House Committee on Agriculture, 1970) . breeding research; (2) allow agricultural experiThe ASTA managed to get the issue resurfaced ment stations to increase needed basic research; in 1969 with new legislation, which eventually (3) permit public expenditures for applied plant became the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 breeding to be diverted to important areas that (Plant Variety Protection Act, 1970). The evenindustry might not pursue; (4) give farmers and tual Act was the product of substantial comgardeners more varietal choice, and higher yieldpromise in language and intent. The purpose of ing, better quality varieties; (5) make American the Act is "to issue 'certificates of plant variety agricultural products more competitive in world protection' assuring developers of novel varieties markets; (6) provide benefits to consumers of of sexually reproduced plants of exclusive rights crops and crop-products, either through imto sell, reproduce, import or export such variproved quality or greater production; and, (7) eties or use them in the production of hybrids for foster continued breeding of new varieties by a period of 17 years" (Plant Variety Protection university experiment stations, which can license Act, 1970, p. 1). The effect was establishment of them to seed companies for a share of the proa patenting system for sexually reproduced ceeds. Vegetable processors who objected to the plants. However, due to the opposition by major PVPA in 1970 now support the Act and the vegetable processors, six vegetables, okra, caramendments. Their initial objections were that rots, cucumbers, tomatoes, celery, and peppers, patent protection would cause prices of these were excluded (U.S. Congress, House Commitvegetables to increase tremendously. They aptee on Agriculture, 1970 Thus, it would seem that, underlying all the following scenario as a possible justification for various arguments surrounding the PVPA and opponents' concern for growing concentration in proposed amendments, there are really two centhe seed industry: the opportunity for vertical tral underlying issues-the economic concentraand horizontal integration, as well as diversification of the industry and the loss of genetic varition, presents itself in this situation. Seeds, ferability. These are further examined below.
tilizer, and pesticides are all marketed similarily and simultaneously. Acquisition of seed companies by firms selling the other inputs can re-ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION duce costs while expanding markets for these IN THE SEED INDUSTRY firms. In some instances, fertilizers and pesticides are complements for seeds. For example, Since 1970, a number of independent seed seeds producing a high yield per acre but with firms have been purchased by large (some multiinadequate resistance to disease will require national) corporations, many of whom are inmore pesticide. Another reason for acquisition of volved in the agrichemical and/or petrochemical seed companies lies in the potential for seed coatbusiness. Some of the recent acquisitions are ing and pelleting. The seed thus becomes a delivshown in Table 1 . As evidence supporting allegaery system for chemicals and biologicals to the tions of economic concentration, however, this is field. Additionally, research may be coordinated liable to be charged as being only circumstantial, among these inputs in a more effective and effisince the intent of acquisition is not explicit, and cient manner. Finally, membership in UPOV the dates of acquisition are coincidental with the would extend breeders' rights to member napassage of the PVPA. Nevertheless, consider the tions. If a firm acquiring a seed company is mul4The National Sharecroppers Fund, the Consumers Federation of America, the National Center of Appropriate Technology, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Environmental Policy Center, and the People's Business Commission. In addition, the National Farmers Union and the National Association for Gardening urged further study of the act prior to passage of the amendments. tinational, membership in UPOV could potenwhich market share information is available. tially "homogenize" its markets, enabling the esTwo firms, Pioneer and Dekalb, have controlled tablishment of a system that transcends geoabout half of this market for several yearsgraphic boundaries. This scenario would suggest 46 percent of the sales in 1979 and 45 percent in that the seed industry could be a catalyst for ex-1973 . When the market shares of the next 6 leadpanding seed and agricultural chemicals markets ing firms are included, (Funk, Trojan in developing countries, as well as domestically.
Northrup-King, Golden Harvest, PAG, and However, there may be other reasons for acJacques) the 8 leading firms account for 69 perquisition of seed companies. One is the declining cent of the market, a decline from 74 percent in value of the dollar, enticing foreign based corpo-1973 corpo- (Miller, 1980 . The annual market shares rations to "buy American." Another stems from from 1973 to 1979 for the leading firms are shown the consequences of the U.S. tax laws. "A study in Table 2 , and n-firm concentration ratios in of the widely published list of seed companies Table 3 . which have been acquired shows that 20 out of 27
From 1971 through 1975, expenditures for companies listed were owned and operated by seeds and plants rose by 114 percent. For 1976 individual proprietors or a closely held partnerthrough 1980 (estimated), the increase is exship. In these cases, the tax structure of aging pected to be 57 percent. For the decade as a owners was a primary consideration in the sale of whole, expenditures for seeds will have inthe company. ... Some bad legislation in the creased 236 percent. The annual increase in exform of gift taxes, death duties and capital gains penditures for seeds from 1971 through 1980 is taxes sometimes puts extreme pressure upon a 13.6 percent. family business to sell out .. . [leading to the If the rise in seed expenditures is due primarily conclusion] that the basic reason for the merger to industry growth, then the charge that patents and sale of seed companies has been due to the have led to higher seed prices is somewhat U.S. tax laws" (Seed Trade News, 1980, p. 13).
weakened. The tremendous rise in seed expendiWhile this may explain why some seed comtures is not attributable to growth alone, howpanies are sold, it does not offer any explanation ever. More than half the increase in expenditures of why they are purchased. Although the latter results from increases in seed prices. Therefore, reason has been discussed by advocates of plant changes in the structure of the seed industry may protection, there has been little, if any, discusalso be shown by examining data on seed prices sion of the international capital flow question.
( In an effort to clarify some of the arguments F P a F F concerning economic concentration in the seed ces sectcdes, heriie, ad f iies industry, the following section examines some (insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides), industry, the following section examines some like seeds, account for a relatively small portion aspects of the structure and concentration in the l ike seds, account for a relatively sma portion farm seed, farm pesticide, and fertilizer indusof total production costs-for 1980, 3.5 percent trm see r esiie a eriier i s ($2.8 billion) of current operating expenses and tries.
By looking at growth in expenditures and prices of related input industries, perhaps some T r r r r Firm 1973 Firm 1974 Firm 1975 Firm 1976 Firm 1977 Firm 1978 Firm 1979 prices can be more clearly evaluated if changes in The market for seed corn is the only one for Sorghum of the structure of these 3 input industries? The tioning without patent protection? In other words, is the market, with PVPA, doing a better job of providing society the amount, kind, and quality of food desired? and inefficiently through the planter. The seeds must germinate and grow simultaneously, or they leave space for weeds to GENETIC VARIABILITY grow in the row where the cultivating machine must go ... A central element in this issue is the role of the PVPA as a cause of the loss of genetic variability.
Crops must be uniform for harvesting. ToIs genetic variability decreasing and, if so, is this matoes, peas, and potatoes must ripen at a significant threat to our food supply? the same time if they are to be machine harVarious crop characteristics considered desirvested because the machine cannot distinable by farmers, marketing agents, food retailers, guish between a green tomato and a ripe and consumers converge to delimit the search by one. . . . And so it goes, uniformityalplant breeders for parent materials. Only a few ways uniformity" (National Academy, varieties are likely to possess the desired charac-1972, p. 289). teristics at any particular point in time. Thus, meeting the demands of society for more, better, There is some evidence that genetic losses and less costly food and fiber inevitably dehave occurred and are continuing to occur-the creases the genetic base of a crop. As seeds bequestion is whether or not the rate of genetic loss come more uniform to meet these demands, this is tolerable and if PVPA has influenced this rate. may, in turn, increase crop vulnerability to pests
The narrow varietal base for the major field crops and disease. The National Academy of Sciences is suggested by the following and by the data in has aptly described this situation: Table 5 : (1) 71 percent of the nation's corn acreage depends on just 6 varieties; (2) the 1970 corn "Clearly the market wants uniformity. If blight destroyed nearly one-fifth of the crop that one breeder or one farmer fails to provide year; (3) wheat stem rust took 65 percent of the it, the market will turn to another that will Durum wheat in 1953 and 75 percent in 1954, and . . . the market is just as insistent on cost as 25 percent of the bread wheat crop in 1954; (4) 40 on uniformity. The market wants to pay the percent of the hard red winter wheat acreage is lowest price. If one farmer cannot sell it for dependent on only 2 varieties and their derivaa price, another will. tives; and (5) soybeans consist of only 6 major varieties. Demands for efficiency are really demands Society must be willing to trade off some for uniformity in a different guise. The amount of genetic diversity in order to have farmer must have high-yielding varieties. more, better, and less costly food and fiber. InBecause the low-yielding members of the telligent decisions on the desired extent of the plant population have been eliminated, this trade-off requires information on the costs and too means uniformity. The farmer must benefits involved. The benefits of uniformity are, substitute machines for men, but machines as described above, efficiency in production, can't think, again varieties must be uniyield, attractive food, and reasonable prices. All form.... these factors give consumers a choice in the market-the ability to choose from an abundant Seeds are sown by machines. These too supply, in a competitive market, at reasonable must be uniform or they move unevenly prices.
Ironically, opponents of plant variety protecenvironmental pressure" (Seed Trade News, tion fear that the very attributes that society de-1980, p. 15 ). sires to maximize may result in choices actually
The research needed to help society choose becoming more limited because of the inherent between these polar positions is obvious. risks of uniformity. In other words, society desires some degree of uniformity for the benefits it provides; but, after some point, uniformity could result in decreased or more uncertain benefits. SUMMARY Opponents of plant protection argue that the extent of uniformity is dangerous. In simple terms, That such a seemingly inconsequential bill as the opponents feel that the marginal cost of the amendments to the PVPA could arouse so monoculturing is increasing relative to the marmuch controversy and debate is illustrative of the ginal benefits derived. Furthermore, they percomplexities involved in the policy process. The ceive plant protection legislation as a contributapparent intent of the PVPA and the proposed ing factor toward increasing this cost/benefit amendments is to increase the research in the ratio. On the other hand, advocates are cognizant private sector by offering publicly granted ecoof the problems and risks incurred by a loss of nomic incentives-patents. The degree of sucgenetic diversity; but they perceive plant proteccess of this approach has produced most of the tion legislation as a beneficial contribution. That debate. Some opponents have also questioned is, the marginal benefit of patents is greater than the intent, fearing a diminution of publicly the marginal cost or risk involved. As the Execufunded research. tive Vice-President of ASTA Dr. Harold Loden Two conclusions seem to emerge. The first is perceives the situation: "Farmers want to grow that a definitive or quick resolution is unlikely, the variety that makes the highest yield. Seedsdespite passage of the amendments by the Conmen and breeders produce and sell the best varigress. As global food needs continue to increase, ety possible. Why should anyone, including a as concern for nutrition as well as abundance of poor farmer, be burdened with the responsibility food supply increases, and as environmental of growing inferior varieties to maintain genetic concerns demand more attention, policies didiversity at the expense of higher yield to his rectly and indirectly (such as genetic variability) family and others" (Seed Trade News, 1980, p. affecting the food supply will be more controver-15).
sial issues. Advocates of plant protection feel that the The second conclusion is that a comprehensive issue of genetic variability will arise irrespective study of the several aspects of this issue is sugof the PVPA and that is can be resolved even gested in order to address the primary questions with such legislation. Again, a view of ASTA:
raised by the Plant Variety Protection Act. Chief "Genetic diversity and variability are preserved Justice Burger stated that it is incumbent upon in germplasm 5 banks throughout the world, (in) the legislative bodies to undertake the kind of seed storage laboratories, in genetic stocks preinvestigation and examination demanded by served by seed companies, (and in) seeds saved these issues that the Court is incapable of providby farmers for their own use (which is permitted ing. In fact, the Senate Agriculture Committee by the PVPA) as well as (in) a reservoir of genetic requested, and the Department of Agriculture is diversity in the wild. There is even a genetic currently providing, a study to provide some variation in so-called "finished" varieties that clear indication of the impact of this legislation will respond and become visible with changes in on both the seed industry and society.
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